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Will Kennedy, the bright flash on Montana's Populist scene in the early 1890s,
never dodged a political conflict, never
avoided a public controversy, and never
withheld his views. He was the persistent, often strident, and sometimes radical voice among those Montanans who
accepted the label Populist. Some of his
opponents called him a crank and many
dismissed him as an eccentric, but it was
difficult for them to ignore his accomplishments. Kennedy, almost singlehandedly, had crafted legislation that introduced the Australian ballot to Montana, coerced the territorial legislature to
accept it, and followed that law with an
effective electoral registration reform act.
As a reformer, Will Kennedy never failed
to impress friends and foes with his integrity, his dedication, and his seriousness. He advocated reforms as varied as
public ownership of utilities and Henry
George's single tax.
In 1888 he founded and edited the Age, a
weekly reform-minded newspaper published in Boulder, Montana, a small mining and ranching community just about
midway between two politically powerful cities, Butte and Helena. He sat three
times as a member of the territorial legislature, ran three times as a candidate for
the state assembly, tried for election to
Montana's Constitutional Convention in
1889 , and once contended for governor.
Not an advocate of reform for its own
sake, Kennedy never failed to have in
hand one or more suggestions on how
public policy could be formulated more
democratically and applied more equitably. Although he appeared to shift from
one reform movement to another and
from one proposed measure to another,
the common denominator of the causes
he espoused was the democratization of
American life.

WmKennedy was born at the head of
the Sassafras River, on the Eastern Shore
of Maryland, on October 29, 1845. During his youth. the Kennedy family
moved around the Middle Atlantic area
and finally settled in southern Indiana
during the late 1850s. His father's itinerancy and middling success as a farmer
and molder probably prompted 15year-old Will's decision to join up with
the 52d Indiana Infantry as a drummer
boy in September 1861. He reenlisted in

February 1864, after shouldering a rifle
in several battles in western campaigns,
and eventually attained the rank of corporal before mustering out in Alabama in
September 1865.1

One Path to
Populism

He lived at home for a year before heading west, first to Independence, Missouri, where he taught school in 1867,
then to Denver, and finally to Santa Fe in
1868. Teaching school evidently did not
hold his interest. His wanderlust and
search for a steady occupation took him
to most of the major towns on the plains.
In Topeka he apprenticed as a printer in
1872, and from then on Kennedy pursued a journalistic career as a printer,
correspondent-reporter. and editor. After
several years of work experiences all
over the Midwest and South, from Minnesota to Florida, he came to Montana in
the spring of 1881.2

Will Kennedy and the
People's Party of
Montana

Arriving at Butte, Kennedy soon relocated in Missoula, where he worked for a
short time on the staff of the Missoulian,
then quickly moved on to Deer Lodge
and a position on James H. Mills's New
Northwest. Two years later he took his
talents back to Butte, working on Lee
Mantle's Daily Inter Mountain until
summer 1884. In that year he returned to
the Missoulian, where he stayed until
1887, when he took a position on the
Helena Daily Independent. It was the
next year, in 1888, that he moved to
Boulder and founded the Age. All, save
the Independent, staunchly expressed a
GOP political line.3
In his political style Kennedy bordered
on the flamboyant, and in his expression
he struck many as enigmatic. But populism. like other popular reform movements in our history, seemed to attract
enigmatic and eccentric adherents. One
major interpreter of the movement has
claimed that populism was at least partially the product of group anxieties and
individual cranks who spun a conspiracy theory of history and concocted a
simplistic vision of a new economic or-

1. Age (Boulder, Mont.), Sept. 12, 1888: New
Northwest (Deer Lodge, Mont.). Jan.18.1889.

2. New Northwest. Oct. 8, 1886.
3. Ibid; Age. Oct. 5, 24. 1894; Weekly
Missou/ion, Sept. 12, 1888.
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der. In some respects, Will Kennedy exhibited those cranky views and simplistic analyses of what had gone wrong in
the American political economy in the
1890s. He could have been in good company with Mary Elizabeth Lease, "Sockless" Jerry Simpson, and other Populists
who made traditional politicians cringe.
But Kennedy's path to the People's party
was not as twisted as first glance might
suggest; his eccentric darting from one
reform to another was part of a process.
Further, his path was not unlike that of
many others who enthusiastically joined
the Populists believing that they had
found a genuine reform party that could
solve contemporary problems. Tracking
the story of Kennedy's conversion to
populism is worth the effort, particularly
if we want to know more about Montana
populism, although there is more here
t han a tale of parochial politics on the
Rocky Mountain frontier.4

If we are to understand Populist politics,
as one recen t commentator noted, there
are basic questions that need answers. In
addition to ascertaining voting profiles
of Populist legislators a nd investigating
Populists' views on capitalism, racism,
a nd foreign affairs, we need to learn why
individuals became Populists and what
they understood the People's party to be.
Why did Will Kennedy convert to populism, and what did he expect the move•
ment and himself as a Populist to
achieve?5

The People's party that Kenned y joined
in Mo ntana in the spring of 1892 had
been two years in the making and attracted a boisterous cast of reformers,
dissidents. renegades from the major parties, and people who had never before
participated in politics: silver miners,
angry farmers who had given up on the
Grange, Knights of Labor activists and
other union men who had failed at
launching an independent labor party in
1890, followers of Henry George's singletax theories, Farmers' Alliance members,
owners of silver mines, merchants in
mining and farming communities, and
even a few Prohibitionists. This was the
awakening of the reform spirit in Montana, and its legacies would carry into
the next century. Newly charged reforme rs looked at the Montana political landscape with critical eyes; they saw much
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to be changed. Montana populism was
not, as some have portrayed it, solely a
self-interested political movement in
support of free and unlimited coinage of
silver. As Robert Larson has so ably
noted in a recent article, Montana's
Populists had more on their minds than
free silver; they complained about railroad rates, corporate monopolistic practices, importation of immigrant labor,
and many other items in t he mainstream
Populist litany.6
Montana Populists complained the loudest, however, about the government's refusing to remonitize silver. Because they
believed in the power of inflationary currency, free silver was a matter of princi ple, but it was also a matter of self-interested politics. Silver mining, in large
measure, fueled Montana's economy, for
it was the very hea rt of the burgeoning
industrial complex of Butte and Anaconda. Although most Montana politicians advocated free silver by the early
1890s, the Populists' aggressive stance
attracted dedicated reformers. Especially
in the towns and larger cities, however,
the party's general reformist profile
seemed to gain the most enthusiastic
support from urban laborites who were
disgusted with the two major parties. In
Butte, where the Populists held their first
state convention in June 1892, reformers
eagerly flung out their challenge: the
time had come for a genuine alternative
to the reigning political structure in the
state. 7
Will Kenned y, who led the Jefferson
County contingent to the Populists'
inaugural in Butte, mingled familiarly
with the other 34 delegates. He had been
with many of them two years before
when they had organized the ill-fated Independent Labor party, an effort that had
foundered on internal divisions a mong
single-tax followers, eight-hour day advocates, and other reformers. Kennedy,
a long with Samuel Mulville and Peter
Breen of Butte and Caldwell Edwards of
Bozeman, came determined to organize a
third party that could bring power to
Mo ntana's nascent reform politicians.
Lobbying during the convention brought
Kennedy an easy victory over Mulville
and Breen in the nomination for governor. His popular ity equaled that of Edwards, a congressional candidate, and of
Butte's William Y. Pemberton and Hel-

ena's Ella Knowles, nominees for chief
justice and attorney general. In choosing
Will Kennedy the Populists had selected
an able campaigner, a forthright advocate
of Populist reforms, and an articulate
politician. Most important, they had chosen a man who knew what he wanted reformed and how to gel the job done. 8
T he origins of Kennedy's politics are unclear. Like most of his contemporaries,
especially veterans, he was greatly influenced by the Civil War. Above all else.

4. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform
(New York, 1955). 23-130.
5. James Turner. "Understanding the
Populists," /AH, Vol. 67 (1980), 354-73.
6. John D. Hicks, Hofstadter, and Lawrence
Goodwyn, as Robert W. Larson points out in
"Populism in the Mountain West: A
Mainstream Movement," Western Historical
Quarterly. Vol. 13 (1982), 143-64, wrote off
mountain western populism as simply a freesilver movement. Larson argues convincingly
that Populist parties in Idaho, Montana,
Colorado, New Mexico, and other western
states were mainstream Populist groups
which targeted railroads and corporate
monopolism as reform objects as much as
monetary policy.
7. Thomas A. Clinch, Urban Populism and
Free Silver in Montana: A Narrative of
Ideology in Political Action (Missoula. 1970),
49-52. Clinch 's study is the only full
investigation of Montana populism. Although
he demonstrates that free silver was not the
only issue for Montana Populists, he puts far
too much emphasis on the labor and Butte
mining origins of the party in Montana. The
Montana Populist story is much broader and
needs a new full-scale study.
8. Butte Weekly Miner, Aug. 21, 1890,
June 23, 1892; Clinch, 45-53; Butte SemiWeekly Inter Mountain, June 19, 1892: Age,
June 22, 1892.
9. Will Kennedy to brother, May 30, 1878, SC
1659, Archives, Montana Historical Society
(MHS), Helena.
10. Clark C. Spence. Territorial Politics and
Government in Montono, 1864-89 (Urbana,
Ill., 1975), 181-211, esp. 191,233.
11. Council Journal of the Fourteenth Regular
Session of the Legislative Assembly of the
Territory of Montana (Helena, 1885), 18, 57,
83. 94, 174: Helena Weekly Herald. March 25,
1897.

12. Missoulion, Sept. 12, 1 888; Council
Journal (1887), 74, 138, 186; Compiled
Statutes of the Regular and Extraordinary
Sessions of the Fifteenth Legislative Assembly
of the Territory of Montano (Helena, 1888),
614-16.
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he spoke as a critic of the South and of
the Bourbon Democrats who resisted the
new postwar order. In the 1870s he
worked on several midwestern and
southern newspapers, including Adolph
Ochs's Chattanooga Times. Most of these
papers were Republican in politics, but
better pay and higher position, not political affiliation. seem to have been the
chief factors in Kennedy's itinerancy. In
fact, there are indications that Kennedy
had little use for politics. At one point he
described the political arena as a place in
which "the vast amount of public and
private corruption ... is undeniable."
Writing to his brother in 1878, he lamented: "If I follow the business of
printer and editor I must pay more or less
attention to politics, and the prospect almost makes me give up my trade and go
at some business that would not bring
me so much in contact with what is unpleasant and wrong." Yet, when Kennedy did give his views about the national political scene, he did so with
strong convictions. There was a certainty
in the opinions he expressed in family
correspondence in the 1870s that anticipated his later editorial stridency. His
summatioh of the Democrats' attempts to
"steal" the presidency from Hayes in
1876, for example, was cynical and to the
point. They did their tricks, he concluded, "for the few paltry offices that
the Republicans still hold. " 9

Bythe time he came to Montana, Kennedy had overcome his earlier reluctance
to wade in the political waters. A committed and energetic Republican- although he would never adhere religiously to the GOP line-he soon
involved himself in local and territorial
politics. Having won a seat in the upper
house of the legislature in 1884, representing Missoula County, Kennedy
found Montana politics to be hot and
feisty. The territory, which had a heavily
Democratic population, had endured
over 20 years of political u~rest as Republican-appointed territorial officials
clashed with Democratic legislatures. Although a Unionist and a strong Republican, Kennedy realized how politically
lethal the old squabbles were; he steered
clear of them and plotted his own
course.to
Kennedy's chief legislative interest in

1885 centered on local and county government, but he introduced no especially
noteworthy bills in that first session.
Nonetheless, he acquitted himself well
and earned the reputation of being a fair
man who operated above or in avoidance
of partisan prejudices. Even as he maintained a relatively low political visibility, Kennedy attracted his share of political opponents. Most objected to his style
not his politics; later they would fault
him on politics too. But in 1885 he took
care to serve his constituents, and they
rewarded him with reelection to the
council in 1886 by a larger margin than
before. 11
Kennedy played a much more aggressive
hand in the 1887 legislature. He knew
more now about the political system in
Montana, and he understood the importance of representing local interests; he
had been reelected at least partially because of his opposition to a county-splitting scheme that might have been inimical to Missoula County residents. More
than a resolve to represent his county,
however, directed Kennedy's energies.
As a 10-year member of the Typographical Union and a 3-year member of the
Knights of Labor, he forthrightly advocated workingman's rights. Early in the
session, for example, he introduced a bill
to establish a territorial labor arbitration
board to act, upon application by either
employers or workers, in the resolution
of disputes. Kennedy not only argued
vehemently for the protection of workers
and unions in labor conflicts, but he also
wrote democratic protections into the
statute. He proposed that the three-man
arbitration board include one labor representative, one employer, and one disinterested citizen, all appointed by the
governor acting with the advice and consent of the council. Kennedy's bill, one
of the first such laws enacted in the nation, was his first significant legislative
victory. 12
After the session in 1887, Kennedy decided to remain in Helena and work for
the Daily Independent, a Democratic paper. Clearly a good journalist, he must
have given the newsmen at the Independent cause for glee when he joined them
instead of their rivals at the outspokenly
Republican Helena Herold. Whether ii
was the lure of reporting politics in the
territorial capital or an early twinge of

discontent with the Republican party
that enticed him to write for the Independent, the experiment lasted only a few
months.
Very likely his aggressive journalistic
style, hot temper, stubborn behavior, and
ties to the Republican establishment determined his short tenure there. ln January 1888 Kennedy complained to his sister about his treatment at the hands of
the lndependent's editor. ''I got so provoked that I have had no ambition to do
good work if I had been able," he wrote,
adding, "I will not stay with the institution more than two or three weeks
longer." Although it was not until 1889
that he began to express single-tax ideas
in print, Kennedy later claimed that he

Behind Will Kennedy's apparent vacillations in
politics and causes was a steadfast
commitment to broad popular democracy.
(Montana Historicsl Society, Helena) .
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had been fired from the Independent because his writing "smacked too much of
Henry Georgeism to suit the plutocratic
owners of that sheet." One thing is certain: by early 1888 Will Kennedy had acquired enough confidence in his journalistic talents and believed strongly
enough in his political views to risk his
capital and future on his own newspaper
in Boulder, Montana. 13
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literally devoted column upon column to
boosting local business. mining, and
community development, political opinion commanded the paper. The Age purveyed politics not news: state and national news occupied less than 10
percent of each issue. 15

B oulder amounted to little more than a
large village when Kennedy arrived in
March 1888. The area had developed
around mining, mostly placer gold in the
early years, but the silver boom of the
late 1870s and early 1880s had boosted
economy and hopes. With a population
of 1,000, only one-tenth that of Butte or
Helena. Boulder bustled with activity. Its
citizens supported one newspaper, the
Jefferson County Sentinel, boasted of hotels and businesses. and anticipated rail
connections that would make it a city to
rival any in the territory.

Kennedy's editing made the Age more
than his tabloid soapbox. He chose his
topics carefully. pursuing only those he
believed were in the political interest of
the people at large. He audaciously proclaimed himself the people's tribune, the
one who alerted them to impending
losses of freedom or denials of rights, the
one who defended the public interest in
the battle against the monied and privileged groups. Although inconsistencies
in political ideology punctuated Kennedy's thinking as he moved toward and
became active in populism, throughout
the seven years that he owned the Age.
his advocacy of an equitable society
grounded in popular government remained constant.

Kennedy found Boulder attractive. His
health, which had not been good for several years. inclined him to Boulder's hot
springs: he believed that the springs had
healing powers. Politics brought him
there, too. Local businessmen urged Kennedy to locate his Republican paper in
Boulder as a competitor to the Democratic Sentinel. Finally, Kennedy genuinely saw a bright future for the town: he
fully expected Boulder to vie for the big
prize of becoming the new state of Montana's permanent capital. As he told his
readers in his inaugural issue, "it will be
the aim of The Age to do everything in its
power consistent with right and reason
to further the prosperity of Jefferson
county." 14

In his move to the Boulder Valley in
1888, Will Kennedy did not discard his
own political career. He and his wife of
five months. Florence Honore of Missoula, had barely moved their household
goods when he jumped into the middle
of a hotly contested local issue, construction of a new Jefferson County courthouse. Despite his playing a minor role
in the dispute, which quickly cooled,
Kennedy sufficiently impressed his readers and those fighting the battle to win
nomination as the Republican candidate
for the territorial council in 1888. Running in a strongly Democratic county, he
squeaked out a slim 84-vote victory at
the polls. He would be returning to the
council for the third straight time. 16

Although Kennedy promised that the
Age would not "assume the championship of either party," almost everyone
recognized it as a Republican paper. But
for those with a discerning eye, there
were signs of what the Age soon would
become: "While remaining neutral as far
as political parties are concerned. the
editor reserves the right to discuss when
deemed advisable such questions of political economy as he may consider of
importance or interest to the readers of
the paper." In fact, those "questions"
dominated the Age. Although Ke nnedy

For Will Kennedy, electoral reform became the only real issue in the 1889 legislative session. If his previous two terms
in the council had convinced him of anything. it was that political bosses who
represented special interests, often railroads and other corporate groups, acted
with contempt for democracy. Electoral
abuses abounded, and Kennedy made
their reform his personal goal. He formulated two suggestions. First, the legislature should enact a law providing for the
use of the Australian or secret ballot at
all elections. Second, although he had

opposed a new registration law in 1887
because it was too restrictive- bucking
his own party in the process-Kennedy
now called for genuine reform of the old
electoral registration statute. He pressed
hard in the council for a law that would
protect voters from intimidation and
make the manipulation of the electorate
more difficult. t 7

K ennedy took up his reforms. especially the Australian ballot, with enormous energy and determination. Few expected him to succeed, but he never
doubted the truth and power of his own
rhetoric. For him the secret ballot reform
became a remedy for all of Montana's political ills. As he browbeat his fellow
council members, those who thought
him strong-willed but ineffective took
little notice. while others became uneasy, realizing, perhaps. that his zealous
advocacy could not be easily countermanded. One critic, employing tonguein-cheek humor to deflate the issue and
prick Kennedy's enthusiasm. charged
that Kennedy should be ashamed for introducing a "foreign" idea to the American political system: what was wrong
with a good old Yankee ballot? the critic
asked. Still, even the few who took notice of his considerable efforts knew that
the odds were against him, although
Governor Preston H. Leslie had urged the
legislature to consider the Australian
ballot measure in his message to that
body in January.1s
Kennedy introduced his Australian ballot bill early in the session and immediately began lobbying. pressuring, and
prodding for its passage. Knowing that
the bill might founder early on in the

13. Kennedy to Anna Trippet. Jan. 29, 1888,
MHS; Age, Oct. 24, 1894 (last quotation).
14. Age, March 21, 1888.
15. Ibid.

16. Age, March 21, 28, April 11, 18, 25. 1888:
Ellis L. Waldron. Montana Politics Since 1864
(Missoula. 1958). 47.
17. Age, Oct.3.1888; Missoulian, Sept. 12,
1888; Inter Mountain, Feb. 15. 21, 1887.
18. Age. Feb. 20 (quoting from the Helena
fournal). Oct. 17, 1888; Council Journal
(1889), 24-26.
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conservative council and that leaders of
both parties opposed the measure, Kennedy sidestepped confrontation politics.
He knew that in the political clinches he
would lose, but in the open field of public opinion he hoped to rescue the measure. How could he mobilize public
opinion on an issue as potentially vague
and basically lackluster as electoral reform? The Age- wit h a peak circulation
of 1,500 lo 2,000- could not reach
enough people to raise their awareness
and inspire them to some form of direct
political action. Kennedy initiated the
direct action himself. Using tactics that
would be repeated in subsequent campaigns, he printed petition forms and
distri buted them around the state, urging
those who supported the law to return
the signed petitions to him. "Those who
favor the system should write to Legislators of their acquaintance," Kennedy
told Age readers, "and insist upon the
passage of Council Bill No. 8, and some
strong petitions would not be entirely
ineffectual. " 19
Day after day in the council he introduced these petitions supporting the
Aust ralian ballot. From large and small
communities in nearly every county in
the territory. the petitions arrived with as
few as 9 and as many as 214 signatures
on them. At the introduction of each petition, Kennedy assumed the liberty of
arguing the merits of the bill before the
council. Again and again he waved the
petitions at his colleagues, pressed his
case anew, and forced them to contend
with the issue.20
Both parties split on council bill 8, and
Kennedy squabbled with other Republicans over the issue. The New Northwest
of Deer Lodge, for example, questioned
Kennedy on the exact provisions of his
bill and urged that a companion registration law be attached to it. Intent o n keeping his bill unamended, Kennedy held
firm for the complete, unadulterated
Australian ballot system. Other Republicans simply opposed the idea and
Ke nnedy's bill. Taking the offensive.
Kennedy played on partisan competitiveness. He reminded his party colleagues of how easily Anaconda's
Marcus Daly, one of the powers of the
Montana Democratic party, had manipulated the 1888 election to block his Democratic archrival W. A. Clark from selec-

tion as Montana's territorial delegate.
Then he pointedly asked if they wanted
to bear the consequences of that kind of
politics in the future. "He is a businessman," Kennedy characterized Daly, "and
politics is ' business' with him .. . . The
only hope of the Republican party in this
Territory is in a measure which will prevent the control of votes in an undue
manner, and perfect secrecy of the ballot
is the way to secure this. " 21
Kenned y stood on solid ground and he
knew it. In Montana, he reminded fellow
party members, Democrats outnumbered
Republicans, and as long as Daly, Clark,
and other Democratic mineowners were
q uick to use their employees' votes to
manipulate elections, the Republicans
could expect losses. In 1888, for example, Daly was charged with transporting
50 workers from one precinct to another
to prejudice the election results. Kenned y's arguments and strategies had telling effects. His petition campaign and
his continual references to the whole
specter of the ongoing Clark-Daly political feu d were the chief factors in the passage of council bill 8. Governor Leslie
signed it into law on March 15, 1889.22

T he Australian ballot law provided that
all ballots would be printed at public expense and that all elections, save those
for school trustees, would be conducted
under the law's provisions. County
clerks in conjunction with the territorial
secretary held responsibility for administering the law, and voters were to
receive and mark their ballots in a prescribed manner. Further, ballots would
be allotted by precinct, and election
judges would supervise each polling
p lace. The 35 sections of the law covered
procedures and contingencies from
printing the ballots to the official election canvass.23
Will Kennedy had formulated the law he
wanted and relentlessly pursued it until
he achieved success. Then he gloated a
bit and congratulated himself. "The
change of sentiment in regard to the bill
since its introduction," Kennedy told his
readers in an understated manner. "has
been remarkable. Few thought there was
the slightest chance for its passing the
Council . . . [but our] persistent effort
. . . to keep the subject before the minds

of the legislators . . . was successful."
Montana, as Kennedy noted, would become the first "political di vision in the
United States to elect State officers under
what is known as the Australian system
of voting." Although Massachusetts and
other states had passed similar measures,
Montana's first state elections. on October 1, 1889, would inaugurate statewide
use of the Australian ballot in the country. The Nation called the Montana legislation " the most thorough because the
law of that new State is a complete application of the Australian system in its
most essential principles- that is, in requiring secret voting by the use of exclusi vet y official ballots. "2 4
Kennedy knew that enactment of the
Australian ballot law alone could not absolutely insure fair elections. Bribery
and vote buying remained possible, but
he hoped that "bribers will not dare to
trust with a secret ballot the men who[m]
they can bribe." A much more plausible
threat to fair elections, however, loomed
in the amendment of the new Jaw by the
next legislature. Kennedy remained vigilant during the 1889 political season and
warned his readers that the new legislature, scheduled to meet upon the governor's call within 20 days of Montana's
admission to the Union. could change
the election law. If the Democrats tried to
damage it, he believed, they would
"meet the prompt condemnation of the
people." But fate withheld from the first
state legislature the opportunity to tamper with the law; it expended the entirety of its 90-day life in chaos. the
result of extreme partisanship and disp uted election results from one precinct
in Butte.25
19. Age, Feb. 13, 1889.
20. Council Journal (1889), 58,111,119,125,
127. 131.136,141-42. 144. 148. 154,208.
21. New Northwest, Jan. 4, 1889; Age. Jan. 16,
1889 (quotation).
22 . Council Journal (1889), 284.
23. Laws, Resolutions and Memorials of the
Territory of Montana Passed at the Sixteenth
Session of the Legislative Assembly (Helena,
1889), 135-45.
24. Age, March 6 (first quotation). May 8,
1889 (second quotation); Notion, Vol. 49
(Oct. 17, 1889), 304.
25. Age, May 29 (first quotation), Oct. 9, 1889.
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When the 1889 legislative session ended
in March, Kennedy felt satisfied, but he
knew that his tangle with other Republicans over the ballot bill had damaged his
position. He had risen quickly in the Republican party, as much because of his
previous experience as because of his
forthright advocacy of issues, but thesession had tested his party loyalty. Now he
faced a critical political decision, one
that would start him on the road toward
a third party.
On April 15, in accordance with the provisions of the Montana statehood enabling act, Governor Leslie announced
an election in May to select delegates to a
constitutional convention, slated to meet
in Helena on July 4. Kennedy's determination to reform Montana's political
structure compelled him to run. Shucking off his Republican label, he resigned
from the Jefferson County Republican
Central Committee and entered the
"Con-Con" race as an independent. 26
Republican leaders expressed no surprise; Kennedy had tipped his hand on
the last day of the 1889 session. In a
speech that day from the council floor,
he explained his reluctant vote for the
Republicans' apportionment bill and
then vented his frustrations:
I am expected, as a Republican, to vote for
this measure; elected as a Republican, I will
vote for it. I must say, however, that I never
voted for a more absurd proposition. Were ii
as harmful as it is absurd. I would vote
against it. Being of no force or effect, 1
concede my judgment and my vote to others.
But I here announce that I will never again
place the control of my judgment and my vote
in the hands of any party, and especially
when that party sets up as its leaders men for
whom I have no respect, either in their personal character or their obi/ ity as leaders .21

James Mills. the Republican editor of the
New Northwest in Deer Lodge and one of
Kennedy's former employers, found the
speech "very ridiculous" and very ill advised. Criticizing Kennedy for thinking
he could be a successful independent,
Mills reminded him that "organization
and united action in politics or war alike
are essential to success." 28
Kennedy appeared unfazed by Republican and Democratic criticism. The Helena Independent charged that he was
foolish to run as an independent because
he had nothing new to offer. The Jeffer-
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son County Sentinel thought he should
forgo running altogether because he was
a current member of the council, and the
Butte Miner opposed him because he
was opposed to woman suffrage. Kennedy brushed these charges aside. claiming that his critics were all captives of
party politics. In his Con-Con cam paign,
which was practically nonexistent, he
promised voters to stand for a larger legislature, longer terms for executive and
judicial branches- with no second
terms allowed, and a prohibition against
selling state school lands. The Jefferson
County electorate gave him only 97
votes, a small fraction of the winner's
tally. This loss, his first electoral defeat
in Montana, spurred his search for a political home, one that could accommodate his views.29

Will

Kennedy's search, conscious or
not, for a political haven had begun years
earlier when he first criticized the political system for harboring privilege and
denying citizens the fullest use of their
freedom. In service of these criticisms,
he had supported labor organizations
and battled for political reforms. As a result. he had broken with the Republican
party on a number of issues. His defense
of the small miners in Jefferson County,
for example, had led him to question the
merits of the tariff, long a staple of the
Republican political diet. Tariffs penalized small businessmen and workers
with higher commodity prices, Kennedy
argued, while helping to create monopolies. He argued for the rights of workingmen and small businessmen and harshly
criticized the monopolistic practices of
large corporations. Now. in 1889, he discovered an approach to the political
economy of the day that incorporated answers to questions he had asked for
years. Neither a political party nor a philosophy, Henry George's single-tax reform was Kennedy's new cause.
Henry George, who had proposed a tax
on land values as early as 1879, defended
small capitalists, workingmen, and shopkeepers. Kennedy identified easily with
him and his thoughts. Like George he
criticized tariffs, believing them to be the
source of workingmen's tax burdens.
Like George he saw economic privilege
as one of the controlling forces in politics. He accepted George's theory that a

single tax on land values would leave
craftsmen the product of their labors,
businessmen the fruits of their risks, and
laborers higher wages, while it taxed
landlords for the unearned increase of
their land values. It was a tidy theory,
and it fit Will Kennedy's assessment of
what had gone wrong with the American
economy. 30
"The Age," Kennedy wrote in June 1889,
"believes that Mr. George has presented
the simplest, surest, most equitable, and
most practicable solution of the problem
in what is known as the Single-Tax theory." From that date through 1891, Will
Kennedy filled his columns with articles, commentary, and analyses of the
single tax. For him it became a virtual
panacea. Adoption of the single tax, he
promised, would eliminate the protective tariff, do away with unjust taxes,
control rent, halt land speculation, rein
in corporate control of resources, and
solve labor disputes. Kennedy even predicted that the contest between Montana
and the Northern Pacific Railroad (NP)
over ownership of mineral lands located
on the railroad's land grant, an issue that
would finally go to the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1895 for settlement, could easily
be solved because the NP would have to
pay such taxes on its land that it "rather
will make haste to dispose of what it has.
Speed the day when the Single-Tax system is adopted in Montana! "3t
The more Kennedy investigated the single tax and reprinted columns from
George's New York newspaper, the Standard, the closer he came to organizing a
political movement in Montana dedicated to transforming the theory into

26. Ibid., April 17, 1889.
27. New Northwest, March 22, 1889.
28. Ibid.
29. Helena Independent, April 25. 1889;
Jefferson County Sentinel (Boulder, Mont. ),
April 26, 1889; Inter Mountain, April 27,
1889; Age, April 24, May 1,1889 (on Con-Con
campaign); Waldron, 50.
30. Charles A. Ba.rker, Henry George (New
York, 1955), 508-23.
31. Age, June 19 (first quotation), Nov. 6,
1889. Jan.29, 1890 (second quotation).
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law. In August 1889, he sparked the formation of a single-tax club in Boulder
and the organization of other clubs soon
after in Marysville, Butte, Livingston,
Helena. and Bozeman. In February 1890.
Kennerly issued his call for a new party
based on the single-tax plan. "The remedy is the rejection of both parties and
the formation of a new party,'' Kennedy
wrote, "with new leaders and a new
principle to fight for. This is furnished in
the Single-Tax idea, which is a protest
against the slavery and the injustice now
laid upon the people by monopolies of
all kinds, large and small."32

Although he devoted his considerable
energy to the effort, Kennedy failed to organize a Montana single-tax party. Finally, after months of poor to meager response to his editorial calls for a new
organization, he announced plans for a
single-tax convention in Boulder in June
1890, hoping that, if invited, his singletax cohorts would attend. Enough of
them came to form a quorum of sorts, but
not enough to fill the hall; it discouraged
him. Always optimistic, he spurred the
conventioneers to organize the Montana
Single-Tax Association, the next best
thing to a political party.3 3
As president of the new group, Kennedy,
with other officers from Butte, Helena,
Livingston, Marysville, and Walkerville,
pushed to get a platform or declaration of
sentiments written and a state single-tax
convention organized. In early August,
the Single-Tax Association met in Butte
to adopt a constitution and platform; its
motto became "Free Land, Free Trade,
and Free Men." and it strongly endorsed
the beleaguered Australian ballot. 34
As might have been expected, Will Kennedy ran for the state senate in 1890 as a
single taxer- the only such candidate in
the state. Because it was not a presidential election year, interest in Montana
centered on the legislative races, the
electorate hoping for a better result than
it got from the chaotic first state assembly. Yet, Kennedy's campaign drew little
or no attention. Editors who had criticized him before practically ignored him
in 1890. That must have been deflating
for Kennedy, but it must have been absolutely depressing when he got word of
the official election results. He received

only 56 votes, and his own hometown
gave him only 5. Kennedy probably
knew more than 56 single taxers in Jefferson County personally!35
He had failed again in a bid for elective
office, but his campaign had been far
from a flop. While he pumped the singletax issue in the campaign, Kennedy also
directed his glare at the political bosses
who were planning a run on the Australian ballot law in the 1891 legislature.
Most prominent among the critics was
the Democratic governor, Joseph K.
Toole. Kennedy lambasted Toole and
alerted other editors to the threat.36
There were papers in Montana that attacked the Australian ballot, calling it
the Botany Bay System or the Convict
Method, but Will Kennedy's editorials
kept the critics honest. Readers of the
Age considered whether "it would be
well for the honest people of Montana to
demand from all legislative candidates
this fall a clear expression of their opinion of the present election law." Late in
the campaign Kennedy charged that if
the people wanted to keep the law they
"must elect to the legislature men who
are superior to party- superior to the
dictation of any caucus which goes
against their judgment." His fears were
justified. Governor Toole included a
challenge to the Australian ballot law in
his message to the legislature in early
January 1891. "The Governors' [sic] suggestion." Kennedy fulminated, "will
hardly receive the general support of
those who favor clean elections and who
remember that much of the fraudulent
voting in Montana is credited to Tunnel
No. 5, Precinct 34," a reference to the
disputed election results from Butte in
1889.37
At least partially because of Kennedy's
vigilance, the Australian ballot survived.
He also continued his editorial serenade
to the single-tax issue, but more and
more, he connected the single tax with
other reforms. Increasingly, Will Kennedy believed that he had to mount some
type of general challenge to the existing
system, but he grew uncharacteristically
pessimistic. When the laborite Peter
Breen introduced an eight-hour law for
underground miners in the legislature,
for example, Kennedy supported the bill
but predicted that the opponents "will

be likely to carry the most weight, as it is
money and not manhood that controls
the legislation these days." When the
law went down to defeat, Kennedy
turned cynical. "The Age does not believe that [the] eight-hour law or any
other form of special legislation will
bring perpetual relief to the laboring
classes. The veil of unequal and unfair
distribution of the wealth produced by
the laboring classes. requires a more radical remedy." Of course, he still saw the
single tax as the remedy , but now he
linked it with a more drastic reform
effort.38

K ennedy cared about the welfare and
future of the laboring people of Montana,
from the wageworkers to the small
miners and shopkeepers-those who
worked but did not own great property
and who were without much political influence. Anticipating by five years William Jennings Bryan's use of metaphor in
his famous 1896 speech, Kennedy drew a
vivid comparison between labor and
capital: "Place Labor, naked and alone,
in the heart of a desert, and in time the
desert will blossom as the rose and send
forth a nation to conquer the world.
Place Capital alone in the richest spot in
God's universe and it will simply rot
away in its own uselessness.·• The struggle between labor and capital, a popular
theme in 1890s protest literature, seemed
to Kennedy to be simply a case of the
weak pitted against the strong, workers
against monopolistic owners. Yet, as he
frequently reminded his readers, the genuine strength of society was in its common people, not in business combines.
"Capital," he charged, "is always timid
and wants extra protection and special
privileges."39
32. Ibid .. Feb.5.1890.
33. Age. April 30. June 11, 1890.
34. Ibid .. June 11. Aug. 27, 1890.
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During the five-year legal tussle over the
Northern Pacific's claim to mineral lands
within its original land grant, Kennedy
took every opportunity to blast the railroad for its monopolistic practices. As a
member of the territorial council in 1889,
he brought in petitions demanding that
the NP be denied any mineral lands in
Montana. Although he criticized the
heavy-handed political tactics of some of
the large mineowners, the combination
of the NP's grab of mineral lands and its
bold political manipulations convinced
Kennedy that the railroad had become
the greatest threat to democracy in Montana. The small miners-an interest
group Kennedy consistently promotedstood to lose if the NP succeeded in
keeping the mineral lands. But worse.
the railroad had grander schemes in
mind. Ken nedy predicted a frightening
political future if the Northern Pacific
went unchecked. "The people are negligent," he warned in 1889, "the corporation is vigilant, and some day. when the
people are somnolent ... the railroad
will slip in and secure vested rights
which it will require a revolution to
overturn." Two years later, when the suit
against the railroad went to court, Kennedy pessimistically told his readers that
"the fight against the Northern Pacific for
mineral lands is a hopeless one, for the
corporations have secured control of the
courts and the legislators of this country,
and the people cannot make a successful
fight for any partial measure of justice."
The bleak picture he painted reflected
his diminishing hope that the people
could wrest control from the NP.40
"The only hope of Montana," Kennedy
wrote upon the court's first decision in
favor of the railroad, "rests in the principle that the land belongs to the people
and can not be alienated; that title to
land rests practically upon use." His insistence that "the land therefore belongs
to all the people," directly came from his
advocacy of George's single tax, but now
he recognized that the single-tax solution
could not attract enough support, could
not fuel a strong enough movement,
could not answer enough questions to
give power to the people. In September
1891, in several editorials, Kennedy
mulled over the problem and concluded
to quit self-defeating conservative political strategies. Reform "will be slow and
wobbly" he remarked. Only decisive,
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risky political action, he told his readers,
would succeed. 41
Only mildly interested in the increasingly popular farmers' alliances, Kenneuy discussed alliance proposals in
1890 and 1891 , sometimes in a slightly
critical manner and other times with
good wishes. But when the few farmers '
alliances and labor leaders, who seemed
to long for an independent political
movement. brought their forces together
in late 1891 and early 1892 to form what
would be the core of Montana's Populist
party, Will Kennedy cautiously led his
single taxers into the new camp. Once in
the movement, however, he quickly converted the Age into a Populist paper. Beginning in January 1892 each issue contained portions of the resolutions passed
at the Cincinnati National Union Conference at which the Populist party had
been born the previous spring. After the
Populists first met as a body in Saint
Louis, in February 1892, Kennedy published reports of the meeting and began
printing the Populist party platform in
the Age. 42

On

April 20, 1892, Kennedy announced to his readers that "in the interest of the people . . . The Age has decided to drop its proposed [single-tax]
movement and coalesce with the [Populist] movement which is national in character." He made it clear that he would
not back away from the single-tax idea;
he simply realized that "two reform
movements in Montana would probably
prove disastrous to each." His promises,
however, did not satisfy some strong
single-tax men in the state. Answering
their charges of desertion the next
month, Kennedy insisted that "The Age
has hauled down its flag" solely to expand "the enunciation and elucidation
of the Single Tax idea." But his critics
were right. From April 1892 on, the Age
trumpeted populism, not single-taxism.43
Kennedy's moving swiftly from one reform front to another hardly distinguishes him from other Montana Populists: the same may be said of Samuel
Mulville, Peter Breen, Robert Smith. and
others. What deserves comment, however, is Kennedy's complete reversal on
two salient points in the Populist platform: free silver and the subtreasury plan.

Kennedy did not like the proposal to
coin silver on an unlimited basis, at the
traditional 16-to-1 ratio with gold, the
first time he looked at it in 1890. He criticized it as a scheme dreamed up by
the large mineowners to line their pockets and leave the average worker destitute. Tbe last thing the people needed,
Kennedy exclaimed, was inflationary
money. "The Rocky Mountain Husbandman," he wrote of the agrarian Montana
newspaper, "says that silver is the poor
man's money. This is about as near true
as is the similar saying that snow is the
poor man's fertilizer. If the poor man depends upon either, he will apt to get left
in the race of life." 44
The more he heard about free silver the
less he liked the idea. In 1891 he called it
"the interest of money against manhood"
and "the height of folly." And he applied
his complaints about free silver to the
subtreasury plan, which called for government purchases of surplus farm commodities at lower than market prices. He
blasted both ideas as short-term, foolish
solutions to complex problems. They
were dangerous, he cautioned, and
would leave working people in even
more jeopardy. 45
Free silver was a key plank in the Montana Populist platform, although surely
not the only important reform demand.
To deny free silver in Montana was to
deny populism, something Will Kennedy hardly could do once he had joined
the movement and accepted nomination
for governor in 1892 under the party's
banner. He swiftly and completely reversed himself on both the subtreasury
and free-silver issues. Voters must support the Populist nominees, he told his
readers, because the other parties only
paid lip service to free silver; Populists

40. Council Journa l (1889), 219; Age, Nov. 6,
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would live or die by it. His conversion to
free silver was indeed remarkable. 46
Kennedy used his direct and challenging
style to good effect .during the campaign
for governor in 1892. He hammered away
at the Populist issues: free silver, government ownership of railroads, direct election of senators, adoption of the initiative and referendum, the subtreasury
plan, and the rest. On the campaign trail
with him, and keeping up a spirited pace
in August and September, was Ella
Knowles of Helena, Populist candidate
for attorney general. 47
Some questioned whether a woman
could run for office, since women did
not have the franchise. Kennedy would
hear none of that; in the Age he defended
Knowles·s candidacy and her capabilities with vigor. But here again was another twist in Will Kennedy's conversion
to populism. When a bill had come before the legislature back in 1889 to allow
women to practice law in Montana, a
bill that was written specifically for
Knowles·s admission to practice, Kennedy had voted against it. Further, he
had proclaimed against woman suffrage
as a Con-Con candidate in 1889. Now he
found himself running on a platform that
endorsed the franchise for women, and
more remarkable, he found himself
standing shoulder to shoulder with Ella
Knowles on the stump throughout the
campaign. Ironically for the orator Kennedy, there is evidence that she, not he.
drew the crowds at their numerous rallies. As one paper put it, everyone came
to hear Knowles: " The lady is a fine elocutionist and in a very pleasing manner
told her audience her little story. Little
Willie Kennedy was there too."48

W ill Kennedy lost his bid to become
governor of Montana to a Republican,
John E. Rickards. Also running behind
the loser, the Democrat Timothy Collins,
Kennedy polled only 428 votes in Jefferson County and ran poorly in every
county except Silver Bow (Butte), where
he finished second. Knowles ran a respectable but losing race, out-polling
nearly every Populist in each county.49
The election over, Kennedy did not desert his new-found party. The Age remained committed to the Populist idea.

Kennedy stressed political over economic issues, but he did not waver from
his full support of the Populist platform.
Yet. he rarely took a strident line in advocating free silver; that solution still
paled when compared to democratic reforms. He played an active role in the
party over the next three years. leading
the Jefferson County contingent to regional and statewide Populist conclaves.
but he worked less and less as a political
organizer and more and more as a publicist and articulator of Populist hopes and
goals. While Breen. James Calderhead,
Absalom F. Bray, and Caldwell Edwards
led Montana's Populists, Kennedy edited
the most influential Populist paper in the
state. He dropped most references to the
single-tax plan. No doubt Henry George's
refusal to support the Popu list party in
1892-he called it a "patchwork"-contributed to Kennedy's disaffection, and
increasingly Kennedy concentrated on
Populist reforms that would democratize
Montana politics.so
Will Kennedy came to populism partly
by choice and partly by accident. His
search for a political home had forced
him to leave an ideological one- the single tax. In his advocacy of the single tax
he had identified economic problems
that needed solutions, but he understood, even while he argued persuasively
for application of Henry George's theories, that it was the political structure
that needed radical reform. And in fact
he had known this for years. The entrenched political managers who had
fought him on the Australian ballot measure remained the powerful obstacles to
broad-based reform.

to a more pragmatic or applied reform
proposition and away from a theoretical
one. It also tapped his strength- electoral reform- while avoiding his weakness-economic theory.
Even before the legislature convened in
January 1893, Kennedy began advising
the three Populist members how they
should act and what strategies they
should use to win approval of direct legislation reform. They held the balance of
power in a house almost evenly divided
between Republicans and Democrats and
therefore were able to get the top two positions, speaker and speaker pro tern.
Bray, a Butte Populist, introduced a bill
calling for a constitutional amendment
that provided for the use of the initiative
and referendum process in Montana. Unable to watch from the sidelines, Kennedy leaped into his last political activist
role as though he were back in the council in 1889. From his command post on
Benton Avenue in Helena, where he resided during the session, he directed
another petition drive, assaulting the legislature with preprinted petitions supporting Bray's amendment.5 1
There were good reasons for supporting
direct legislation, Kennedy told Age
readers. The initiative process would decrease the number of statutes, make better laws in general, educate the electorate, help end venal politics by anteroom
politicos, and improve the quality of legislators. But his editorials and petitions
fell short of victory this time. The defeat
of Bray's amendment angered Kennedy.

46. Ibid., July 20, Oct. 12, 1892.

Returning to his enduring belief in the
virtues of popular government, Kennedy
mounted a new attack on vested political
power. This notion, that the ultimate
power of government had to rest in the
people's hands, dominated his political
thinking during h is remaining years at
the Age. After 1892 he concentrated on
the reform he thought most promising
and far-reaching of the Populist proposals: direct legislation by the people
through the initiative and referendum.
Of course, the idea had been discussed
among reformers for several years and a
few national non-Populist figures had already endorsed it, but Kennedy's advocacy marked a personal turn for him back
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"The petitions for Direct Legislation," he
caustically charged, "were practically ignored, some of the legislators even refusing to present them, apparently thinking
that the people had no right to petition
for anything. "5 2

That the politicians failed to see the
merits of d irect legislation only confirmed Kennedy's cynicism about the political establishment. Why they did not
support this reform is not clear. It might
very well have been Kennedy himself, although no evidence suggests that legislators ignored the proposed amendment
because of his involvement. When he
blasted them for their timidity, however,
there must have been some criticism of
his intemperate ways.
Kenned y went on warning his fellow
Populists of the implications inherent in
the lawmakers' refusal to give legislative
power to the people. Always eager to
ring the tocsin and rally the soldiers in a
good fight, he advised Populists not to
quaver at the thought of a thorough reform. Fear of "being too radical," he told
them, is "a mistake which always hurts
the new party, for unless there is need of
a radical change there is no need of a
new party.'' It was April 1893; he had finally said it, finally arrived at his ultimate reformist stance. From then on,
populism for Will Kennedy became the
partisan opportunity to usher in a radical
reform: direct legislation. 53
Did Montanans truly want to rid themselves of special interest legislation, vicious class legislation, and faulty laws?
Kennedy knew that they did. "The only
remedy for this evil is in requiring the
submission of all laws to the approval of
the people. Then only will special legislation cease. Then only will the lobby
disappear. . .. Then only will be the
power of corporations and monopolies
weakened." He suggested that a plebiscite be taken on each bill passed by the
legislature before it could be signed into
law by the governor. This radical idea
went beyond the use of initiative and referendum procedures; Kennedy had proposed a legislature comprising a committee of the whole of the entire electorate! 54
Beginning in late 1893, because Kennedy
worried that his proposal would die
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without additional publicity and discussion, he ran a remarkable series of articles on direct legislation written by an
impressive range of Montanans, from the
cattleman James Fergus and U.S. Senator
Wilbur Fisk Sanders to the Coxeyite William Hogan and Montana Supreme Court
Justice Theodore Brantly. Over 30 articles appeared on the Age's front page. By
summer 1894, when the series ended,
Age readers had seen nearly every argument on direct legislation, pro and con,
in print. An impressive testament to
Kennedy's belief in his reform and the efficacy of popular education, the series
nonetheless failed to convince legislators
to enact a direct legislation amendment.
Kennedy worked throughout the summer and into the autumn, agitating for a
direct legislation statute that he hoped
would pass during the 1895 legislative
session. But other issues that summer
drew his attention and the sharp interest
of other Populists. Eugene V. Debs's new
American Railway Union had called for
a boycott of Pullman cars after the Pullman Company, following the lead of
other corporations, cut workers' wages as
the 1890s economic depression deepened. Along with Calderhead, Breen, and
other Populists, Kenned y denounced the
actions of the railroad corporations and
the attempts of the federal government to
force an end to the boycott. All of it went
to prove, Kennedy editorialized, "the
contempt which railroad managers have
for all workingmen who do not cringe
and bow and willingly do dirtywork for
thei r employers at starvation wages." At
the state Populist convention that June in
Deer Lodge, Kennedy headed the committee on resolutions and brought to the
floor a strongly worded condemnation of
the railroads, which was sandwiched between resolutions endorsing free silver
and direct legislation. But the summer
took its toll. He emerged in the fall
drained and in poor health. 55

to the Southwest. In late July 1895 he
sold the Age and left for Arizona. Later
he moved to La Colorada in Sonora, Mexico, where he opened a stationery business. In the spring of 1897, Will Kennedy
died in that small Mexican town. 56

E nigmatic, flamboyant, and unpredictable, Kennedy had darted from one political position to another, often baffling
others and contradicting himself in the
process. But he came to populism purposefully, though indirectly, and for his
own reasons, not because of agrarian protest and not with the demand for free silver on his lips. He defended labor's
rights and belonged to labor organizations, yet it was not through the labor
movement that he became a Populist.
What brought him to populism and defined his use of populism was his commitment to popular democracy and to
the fundamental reform of political
institutions.
In Montana the most significant residual
effect of populism was not the shrill cries
for free silver or the demand that the railroad be nationalized; free silver died a
quiet economic death, and the Northern
Pacific Railroad lost its case in the supreme court. Electoral reform carried on
in Montana politics as a legacy of populism. The initiative and referendum,
woman suffrage, and direct primary elections all had their days before 1915. Will
Kennedy, the man who had come to populism by degrees, had championed the
enduring cause in Montana. From his
victory on the Australian ballot to his defeat on direct legislation, Kennedy's path
to populism was the path toward broader
popular democracy. D
52. Age, Feb. 8, March 8 (quotation), 1893.
53. Ibid., April 5, 1893.
54. Ibid., May 24, 1893.

The campaign for direct legislation had
dominated his political life for over two
years when the 1895 legislature ended its
session without approving the reform.
Kennedy had lost his spirit. His weak
physical condition had deteriorated, and
now his physician urged him to seek a
healthier climate. Defeated in the reform
he believed most important, he reluctantly decided to sell his paper and move
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